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MATERIAL SUBMITTEDBYCOMMON STOCK VALUES AND INFLATION—THE HISTORICAL
RECORD OF MANY COUNTRIES
Phillip Cagan
Why Stocks are Viewed as a Hedge
Against Inflation
A perennial threat to long-term investors
is the depreciation in the purchasing power
of financial assets owing to a general infla-
tion of commodity prices. The literature of
investment advice is full of warnings about
inflation and what to do about it.Down
through the ages investors have traditionally
sought protection in real property of various
kinds—land, buildings, commodities, pre-
cious metals, and jewels.In modern times
financial assets have been the preferred form
of investment because of their greater con-
venience and, compared with unproductive
property, positive rate of nominal return.
But most financial assets have a value which
is fixed at time of issue in terms of the na-
tional currency and thereafter will decline in
real value if the currency depreciates. To be
sure,France, Finland,Israel,and other
countries 1haveexperimented with bonds
whose nominal values are linked to a price
index, but such securities are not available
in most countries.
Bonds are not,of course, wholly un-
responsive to inflation.If inflation comes to
be widely expected, the coupon rate of re-
turn will rise on new issues to compensate
for the anticipated depreciation in the pur-
chasing power of the principal, while the
market value of outstanding bonds will de-
preciate commensurately. Since the rate of
inflation issubject to considerable uncer-
tainty ahead of time, the adjustment of inter-
est rates on new issues is far from precise,
'See John Hem, "A Note on the Use of Index
546-52.
and some gain or loss in real terms for lender
and borrower cannot be avoided.
For most investors common stocks have
come to be viewed as the primary hedge
against the uncertainty of future inflation
rates. The rationale is that corporate profits
can be expected to rise along with an infla-
tion of selling prices, thus allowing dividends
to keep up with inflation.Insofar as divi-
dends rise, the market price of common
stocks will tend to rise also. Although not
every company will be affected equally, the
average rise of a broad group of common
stocks might be expected to match the aver-
age rise of consumer prices.
The basic premise of this view—that infla-
tions have neutral effects on the fortunes of
the entire business sector—is generally not
true, however. This was demonstrated once
again during the Vietnam War period. Infla-
tion overtook the U.S. economy in 1965,
and prices continued rising despite a tighten-
ing of monetary policy in 1966 and 1969 to
restrain the growth in aggregate demand. As
a result of monetary restraint and a business
recession, stocks fell sharply in 1969 and
1970.Over the half decade 1965-70 an
index of U.S. common stocks depreciated 15
per cent in real value. (A recovery in 1971
brought their real value almost back to the
1965 level, but in the first part of 1973 a
resurgenceofinflationdepressedstocks
again.)
Aside from major shiftsin monetary
policy, stocks also reflect the changing for-
tunes of business as the economy passes
through the different stagesofinflation.
Earnings usually expand in .the first stages of
Clauses Abroad," Journal of Finance, December 1960,
1inflation because costs lag behind selling
prices.Later, in the decelerating stages of
an inflation, costs may increase faster than
prices do, putting a squeeze on profit mar-
gins. The rosy prospects for business earn-
ings which emerge in the first stage of infla-
tion may thus be dashed in a later stage by a
profits squeeze, whereupon stock values may
decline sharply. Over the business cycle as
well, stock values tend to lead the. move-
ments in general business activity while sell-
ing prices lag, thus giving rise to out-of-
phase cyclical movements.2
Over the long run, as adverse or favorable
short-run developments come and go, adjust-
ments delayed by lags have time to be com-
pleted.. Whether stocks are early or late in
responding to inflation does not matter to the
long-term investor who does not attempt via
short-run purchases and sales to anticipate
the timing and magnitude of inflation. The
main question to him is whether stocks with-
stand long-run depreciations of the currency.
Stocks will provide the desired hedge if they
adjusttoinflationeventually,evenif
gradually.
World War II and After
values among countries are correlated but,
in general, not
Table1coversallcountries reporting
stock and consumer price indexes to the
International Monetary Fund.The table
shows the annual percentage rate of change
in the stock index, the rate of change in the
price index, and in column 3 the difference,
that is, the rate of change of the deflated
stock index (because of rounding it may not
exactly equal the difference between columns
Iand 2 as shown). Column 4 gives the
cumulated percentage change in the deflated
stock index over the period. To illustrate,
stocks in the U.S. during World War II rose
on average 2.7 per cent per year and con-
sumer prices rose 6.0 per cent per year;
hence in real terms stocks fell 3.2 per cent
per year (after rounding). The total decline
in stocks relative to consumer prices over
the period was 25 per cent.
The total return to a portfolio of stocks
is the rate of change in market value plus
the dividend yield. The figures in Table 1
understate the total rate of return on stocks
by the dividend yield.4 This is an undesirable
omission, but data on dividend yields are
unfortunately not generally available. We
may conjecture, however, that the omission
is not serious for present purposes, since the
dividend yield is likely to vary among coun-
tries by far less than inflation rates do and
not to be influenced greatly by the rate of
inflation.The dividend yieldis primarily
determined by the rate of return to business
equity and by the prospects for real growth
in earnings.
Table1isin three sections, covering
World War II, the postwar period to 1969,
and the combined period. The prewar year
of reference is 1939, except for three coun-
tries in which the stock index for that year
was not available or another year seemed
in his forthcoming study, described in the 1973 Annual
How closely do stocks in fact move with
prices in the long run? The period covering
World War II and the subsequent quarter
century provides a good test. For most coun-
tries this was a period with severe inflation
at the beginning and the end andmild infla-
tion inbetween. The response of stocks in
this recent period is relevant to how they will
respond in the near future. And the avail-
ability of data for this period allows a com-
parison of experience in a broad list of coun-
tries.Breadth is necessary to isolate the
effect of inflation from numerous other influ-
ences on stock values. Movements in stock
2John Lintner examines short-run fluctuations
Report of the National Bureau, pp. 23-36.
3See Duncan M. Ripley, "Systematic Elements in the Linkage of National Stock Market Indices," Review
of Economics and Statistics, August 1973, 356-61.
4From 1925 to 1970 annual average dividend yields of industrial shares varied largely between 3 and
7 per cent in the U.S. and between 4 and 7 per cent in Great Britain.
2more appropriate in order to include the
entire inflationary movement. The first sec-
tion ends in various years around 1950, for
each country in a year which captures most
of the wartime rise in stock values and ex-
cludes the Korean War upsurge. The year
1969 was the latest available at the time of
computation. The index link for Japan from
before to after World War II is questionable,
but Japan has been included for complete-
ness.
During World War II stocks depreciated
in real value in most of the countries. The
wartime depreciations can be readily under-
stood in terms of short-run business condi-
tions. Profits sagged for a variety of reasons
including wartime controls and taxation, and
stocks fell in real value. Not until peace
restored normal conditions did stocks re-
cover sufficiently to begin to make up for the
wartime inflation.
In the postwar years, shown in the sec-
ond section of Table 1, stocks in most coun-
tries rose substantially. How much of this
TABLE 1
Stock Values and Consumer Prices Since Pre-Worid War II
Rate of Change
(per cent per year)
Total Change
in Deflated Deflated
Stock Consumer Stock Stock Values






Austria 1937-50 7.0 11.6 —4.6 —45
Belgium 1939-50 7.6 11.6 —4.0 —35
Canada 1939-50 3.2 4.6 —1.4 —14
Denmark 1939-48 3.1 5.5 —2.4 —20
Finland 1939-49 7.6 20.6 —13.0 —73
France 1939-50 19.7 26.9 —7.2 —55
India 1939-50 1.4 10.0 —8.6 —61
Ireland 1939-50 3.5 5.4 —1.9 —19
Italy 1939-50 24.7 34.9 —10.2 —67
Japan 1936-50 6.5 38.2 —31.8 —99
Mexico 1939-48 12.6 12.9 —0.3 —3
Netherlands 1939-50 5.7 7.2 —1.5 —15
New Zealand 1939-48 5.4 4.0 1.4 14
Norway 1939-48 5.3 5.5 —0.2 —1
Peru 1939-50 —0.1 13.4 —13.5 —77
Portugal 1939-50 —0.4 6.7 —7.1 —54
South Africa 1939-50 6.4 4.2 2.3 28
Spain 1940-51 2.4 10.7 —8.3 —60
Sweden 1939-49 2.6 4.1 —1.5 —14
Switzerland 1939-50 1.4 4.2 —2.8 —26
U.K. 1939-50 3.2 5.1 —1.9 —19
U.S. 1939-48 2.7 6.0 —3.2 —25




postwar appreciation was a catching up to
the wartime depreciation? The final section
Qf Table I combines the war and postwar
periods to reveal the long-run response to
the wartime inflation.These figuresare
plotted in a scatter diagram in Chart 1, with
the extreme points labeled.It is clear that
stocks generally appreciated more, in the
countries with extreme inflation (India and
Peru are the main exceptions).
Countries with inflation rates less than
five per cent per year generally lie above the
45-degree line (Denmark and Norway are
the exceptions), which means that stocks
appreciated in real terms (and by even more
than shown here if dividends are included).
Among these countries with low inflation
rates, there is no relation between the rate of
increase in stocks values and in consumer
prices. The rate of inflation was apparently
Rate of Change
(per cent per year)
Total Change
in Deflated
Stock Values Stock Consumer
Deflated
Stock














Belgium 1950-69 3.2 2.4 0.8 16
Canada 1950-69 7.9 2.4 5.5 183
Chile 1950-69 25.5 26.4 —0.9 — 15
Denmark 1948-69 3.8 4.2 —0.4 —8
Finland 1949-69 11.1 5.5 5.6 207
France 1950-69 9.9 4.7 5.2 169
Germany 1950-69 13.3 ' 2.2 11.1 718
India 1950-69 1.5 4.0 —2.5 —38
Ireland 1950-69 6.4 4.0 2.5 60
Israel 1950-69 8.9 8.4 0.4 9
Italy •1950-69 8.1 3.3 4.7 146
Japan 1950-69 13.5 4.7 8.8 535
Mexico 1948-69 4.7 5.2 —0.5 —9
Netherlands 1950-69 7.5 3.6 3.9 110
New Zealand 1948-69 4.7 3.6 1.2 28











Portugal 1950-69 7.2 2.5 4.7 145
South Africa 1950-69 7.1 3.1 4.0 114
Spain 1951-69 5.5 5.4 0.1 3
Sweden 1949-69 8.0 4.0 4.0 125
Switzerland 1950-69 6.2 2.3 3.9 110
U.K. 1950-69 7.5 3.9 , '3.6 98
U.s. 1948-69 9.0 2.1 • 7.0 334
Venezuela 1949-69 3.5 1.4 2.1 52
4TABLE 1(continued)
Rate of Change
(per cent per year)
Total Change
in Deflated Deflated
Stock Consumer Stock Stock Values








Austria 1937-69 9.5 7.4 2.0 92
Belgium 1939-69 4.8 5.8 —1.0 —25
Canada 1939-69 6.2 3.2 3.0 144
Denmark 1939-69 3.6 4.6 —tO —26
Finland 1939-69 9.9 10.5 —0.6 —16
France 1939-69 13.5 12.9 0.7 22
India 1939-69 1.4 6.2 —4.7 —76
Ireland 1939-69 5.4 4.5 0.9 29
Italy 1939-69 14.2 14.9 —0.7 —20
Japan 1936-69 10.5 18.9 —8.4 —94
Mexico 1939-69 7.1 7.5 —0.4 —12
Netherlands 1939-69 6.8 4.9 1.9 79
New Zealand 1939-69 4.9 3.7 1.3 46
Norway 1939-69 2.6 4.3 —1.6 —38
Peru 1939-69 0.8 10.3 —9.5 —94
Portugal 1939-69 4.4 4.1 0.4 12
South Africa 1939-69 6.8 3.5 3.4 175
Spain 1940-69 4.3 7.4 —3.1 —59



















Venezuela 1939-69 4.5 3.4 1.1 41
Source: International Monetary Fund, Financial Statistics,
tisticalYearbook and individual country reports.
with some earlier data from United Nations, SW-
(concluded)
too small to over the other influ-
ences on stock Stocks were a satis-
factory these countries, despite
the inflation, tbècause their nominal values
rose for a variety of other reasons more than
enough tooffsetthe depreciation of the
currency.
Countries with inflation rates greater than
five per cent per year exhibit a covariation
between the rates of change of stock values
and prices, although stocks depfeciated in
real terms in all except Austria and France.
For these countries, ten in all, the Kendall
rank correlation coefficientis + .53(sig-
nificant at the .02 level).
Thus stocks eventually provided protec-
tion against the wartime inflation, but they
took a long time to recover from the depre-
ciation in the initial stages. Table 2 shows
how long they took to make up for the
World War II inflation.Although stocks
in some countries kept up with the inflation
almost from the beginning and by 1948
showed no depreciation in real terms (Aus-
56
CHART 1
Average Rates of Change of Stock Values and Consumer Prices,
Pre-Worid War II to 1969
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TABLE 2
The broader the index, the faster it is likely to rise because it includes newer and smaller companies
which cover the faster growing sectors of the economy. For example, from 1896 to 1965 in the U.S. the
Dow Jones Index of 30-odd industrials rose 4.8 per cent per year while the more comprehensive Standard and
Poor's index rose 5.4percent per year.
7
First Postwar Year from 1948 to 1969
in Which Deflated Stock Values
Exceeded Prewar Level
tralia, Netherlands, New Zealand, and South
Africa) and in some countries fell so far
behind that they had not caught up by 1969
(India, Japan, and Spain), the recovery in
most countries took until the early or mid-
dle 1950s and in some until the 1960s. The
median year by which stocks recovered to
their prewar real values was the mid-1950s
—that is,it took a decade and a half to
regain the lost purchasing power.
Pre-Worid War II
Data for a large number of countries do
not exist for earlier periods, but a small
group of major countries can be examined
for periods as far back as the mid-1880s.
Table 3 presents various combinations of
the period since the mid-1880s for the U.S.,
Great Britain, Germany, and France, and
later subperiods including six other devel-
oped countries. The beginning and ending
years of the subperiods differ slightly among
the countries in order to avoid starting or
ending the period during a rapid movement
in stock values. In most cases, however, the
figures would not be altered greatly by add-
ing a year or two at either end. Since con-
sumer price indexes were not available for
the full period or for all countries, the table
uses the available index of wholesale prices,
which may at times diverge appreciably from
the consumer index. The stock indexes were
confined so far as possible to industrial
shares, omitting utilities and railroads which
are often regulated and thus do not fare well
in inflationary periods. The stock indexes
also tend to favor the large well-established
firms and may not, therefore, always reflect
what happened to all common stocks.5
For the longer periods in Table 3, most
stocks appreciated substantially in real terms


























vested.Since these figures omit dividends,
total rates of return (dividends plus appre-
ciation) were higher by the amount of divi-
dends.Except for World War I,all the
cases in Table 3 of depreciation in real terms
would turn positive with the inclusion of
dividends. Nevertheless, it is apparent that
inflation was not a minor consideration butTABLE 3
Stock Values and Wholesale Prices for Pre-Worid War II Periods
Rate of Change





Stock Values Stock Wholesale
Deflated
Stock
Country Period Values Prices Values (per cent)
Pre-Worid War I
World War I
U.S.A. 1871-1915 2.2 —0.6 2.7 234
Great Britain 1867-1914 1.1 —0.3 1.4 96
France 1856-1914 0.4 —0.5 0.9 69
Germany 1856-1913 0.6 —0.2 0.6 59
Mid-1890s toWorld War I
U.S.A. 1896-1915 4.5 2.1 2.4 57
Great Britain 1896-19 14 0:2 1.6 —1.4 —22
France 1896-1915 2.2 2.0 0.1 2
Germany 1896-1913 0.5 2.0 —1.5 —22
U.S.A. 1913-19 7.4 11.4 —4.0 —21
Great Britain 1913-19 8.7 15.6 —6.8 —34
France 1913-19 5.7 21.2 —15.5 —60
Switzerland 1916-19 —4.9 20.4 —25.3 —53
Japan 1915-19 15.9 22.3 —6.5 —23
World War Iand Postwar
U.S.A.. 1913-40 3.2 0.4 2.7 108
Great Britain 1913-39 2.4 0.9 1.5 47
France 1913-39 3.7 7.5 —3.7. —62
Switzerland 1916-39 1.6 —1.6 3.1 106
Japan 1915-39 0.6 3.6 —3.0 —51
Interwar
U.S.A. 1919-40 1.9 —2.7 4.6 164
Canada 1919-39 5.6 —2.8 8.4 440
Great Britain 1919-39 0.5 —3.5 4.0 122
France 1919-39 3.1 3.3 —0.2 —4
Germany 1924-39 —0.3 —2.9 2.6 47
Austria 1923-38 —4.3 —0.9 —3.4 —40
Netherlands 1919-39 —5.8 —5.3 —0.4 —8
Sweden 1924-39 1.0 —1.3 2.4 42
Switzerland 1919-39 2.6 —4.8 7.4 340
Japan 1919-39 —2.5 —0.2 —2.3 —37
Source: Various country reports.
8absorbed a substantial part of the nominal
appreciation of stocks.°
There is considerable variation among the
countries in both nominal and real rates of
change.The consistently high U.S. per-
formance, reflecting the rapid growth of its
economy in the past century, stands out. No
doubt part of the variation among countries
is due to deficiencies of the individual in-
dexes, many of which are small samples and
not entirely representative of all stocks and
wholesale prices. But the variation also re-
flects the important fact that stock values are
largely determined by business conditions
and by profits which can behave differently
than selling prices in the short run. As a
result, stocks generally preserved their real
value by rising faster than the rate of infla-
tion, but their rate of rise here is not asso-
ciated with the rate of inflation as in the
later period (Chart 1).
How did stocks perform vis-â-vis bonds?
Since bonds do not appreciate in an infla-
tion, the market value of outstanding bonds
depreciates in real value. In an inflationary
period which is not anticipated, therefore,
they are generally inferior to stocks, which
do generally rise even though not at first so
fast as prices. When prices decline, how-
ever, bonds become an investment which
more than preserves the real value of the
principal. Even so, for most countries in the
deflationary interwar period, stocks had a
higher return in real terms, assuming divi-
dend and bond yields were roughly com-
parable.The choice between stocks and
bonds depends, of course, on the rate of
interest prevailing, expectations of inflation,
and degree of preference for the greater sta-
bility of nominal bond prices.
Investments in land or property would
have done better than stocks or bonds in
some periods. Prices of tangible assets ap-
pear to follow prices of goods and services
fairly But such investments other
than homes are more difficult to manage
and are subject to considerable fluctuation
and risk.They are not a practical alterna-
tive for the average investor.
Conclusions from the Historical Record
The common stocks represented in the
indexes examined here have more or less
maintained their real value over long periods
of currency depreciation except mainly for
hyperinflations and war devastation.But
stocks may take many years to catch up to
an inflationary episode.The rise in stock
valuesamong 30-oddcountriQsduring
World War II was not related to the rise
in prices, and inall but three countries
(Australia, New Zealand and South Africa)
stocks rose less.Stock values caught up
after the war, but it took 15 years as a
median time; and, except where the inflation
had been sizable, the relation between infla-
tion and stock values was obscured by other
influences on stock values.
In short, the data presented here indicate
that a comprehensive group of stocks will
protect against inflation, apart from hyper-
inflation or wartime devastation, but not
concurrently.Compared with bondsor
other fixed-value assets, stocks if broadly
selected pass the test as an inflation hedge
only for long-term holdings.In the U.S.,
given those limitations, they have performed
especially well.
° Hyperinflationsand wartime destruction present special extreme cases. In the German hyperinflation of
World War I, stocks depreciated in real terms, according to the available data, by 82 per cent from 1913 to
1923. Unfortunately, because the index does not link over the currency reform in November 1923, we cannot
determine how stocks stood after the reform compared with the pre-reform years. During World War IL stock
losses were severe for Japan and no doubt also for Germany, though a German index does not exist for that
period either.
R. Goldsmith and R. Lipsey, Studies in the National Balance Sheet of theUnitedStates, Vol. 1, NBER,
1963, pp. 176-77.
9Note:
An appendix listing the individual and stock series used in this study may be obtained
from the author upon a request addressedhim at the National Bureau of Economic Research,
261 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016.
This is one part of a National Bureau project to study the effect of inflation on financial
institutions and markets supported by a grant from the American Life Insurance Association.
The preliminary search and survey of sources was done by Doris Preston with the advice of
Raymond Goldsmith. The compilation of data and checking of sources was done by Hanna
Stern.
Miss Stern died in 1972 at a time when she was working on this study. She had compiled
the earlier stock data for ten Western countries. I dedicate the study to her fine contribution of
careful scholarship to this and many previous studies of the National Bureau.
The stock data for. Japan were compiled by Naoya Takebe, an exchange scholar at the
National Bureau during 1971-72 from the Japan Economic Research Center. Susan Tebbetts
finished the compilation of wholesale prices and JMF data and prepared the tables.
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